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1.INTRODUCTION
The law regarding Aboriginal title in Australia is in the midst of a
revolution. From the time Australia was settled by the British in 1788, 99 until
the High Court of Australia's 1992 decision in Mabo v. Queensland,100
Aborigines had no title rights to land whatsoever. In the decade since the
Mabo decision, 101which finally recognized the potential for significant
Aboriginal claims to already-possessed land, there have been enough cases
title claims filed to
decided, statutes enacted and amended and Aboriginal
10 2
chaos.
of
state
a
into
title
native
of
issue
the
throw
The High Court of Australia hoped to clarify the numerous unsettled
native title issues of the previous decade in its August 8, 2002 decision in
Western Australia v. Ward. 10 3 However, the decision, despite being over 200
pages long, may ultimately fail to provide the desired stability in Australian
" See Australia in I WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 895 (A. Richard Harmet et al. eds., 1984).
10 Mabo v. Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR I.
101Id.
102 See Gary D. Meyers & Sally Raine, Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition (Part II): The
Legislative Response to the High Court's Native Title Decisions In Mabo v. Queensland and Wik v.
Queensland, (pt. 2), 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95 (2001) (Discussing the general uncertainty and

state of flux that issues of Aboriginal title have endured since 1992 and the various legislative attempts by
the Australian government to clarify matters since that time).
10' Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098 (This case is also known as the Miriuwung-Gajerrong
case, named after the Aboriginal group who brought the initial claim. "Ward" refers to MiriuwungGajerrong elder and claimant Ben Ward).
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property law. While most observers are in agreement that the ruling has
significantly limited native title rights, especially with respect to lands
claimed by the mining industry pursuant to valid leases, 1 4 there are actually
very few issues that the decision has definitively resolved. In fact, the
precise outcome of the case remanded most issues back to the Full Court of
Australia to decide them based on the new criteria for determining native title
questions that the High Court established in its opinion. 10 5 Also, based on the
continuous state of change that Aboriginal title rights have gone through in
the last decade, even issues that the decision seems to have definitively
resolved may once again have to be revisited and changed.
This note begins with an assessment of the state of native title in
Australia prior to the August 8, 2002 decision. This assessment includes an
examination of the total lack of aboriginal land rights prior to 1992 as well as
the decade of great activity and development in this field beginning in 1992
and leading up to August 8, 2002. It then proceeds into an analysis of the
decision and the specific issues the High Court addressed. This analysis will
include the standards the Court established for determining questions of
native title as well as an emphasis on the decision's effect on the mining
industry in Australia compared to the indigenous population and the rights to
minerals and other natural resources that the decision established. Next, the
note will look beyond the decision and attempt to assess how it will affect the
future of native title in Australia and whether the decision will prove
ultimately beneficial in ending the longstanding battle between Indigenous
groups and the mining industry. Finally, this note will conclude with an
overall evaluation of the decision and will take the position that it will
ultimately be problematic, require further legislative intervention and will
provide less clarity than the High Court of Australia and Australian
government hoped to attain. This note will also take the position that the
most efficient result may be to forego the court system altogether in
resolving native title issues and instead, it may be best for both sides to work
together to establish a system of mediation and negotiation to create land use
agreements through that process.
I1. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO WESTERNAUSTRALIA V. WARD

A. From Settlement to the Mabo Decision
From the time Australia was settled until 1992 Aboriginal land rights
(or lack thereof) were defined by the doctrine of terranullius - a legal fiction
assuming that Australia was unoccupied and that all title to all lands
See, e.g., Belinda Goldsmith, Court Rules Aborigines Have No Rights to Minerals, REUTERS (Aug. 8,
2002), at http://news.findlaw.com/international/s/2002 .../rightsaustraliaaboriginesdc.htm; Legal Battle
Continues, ABC ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2002), at www.abc.net.au/news/indepth/featureitems/s64524 I.htm.
'oSSee Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1192.
'o
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belonged to the British Crown upon settlement. 1 6 As a result, the possibility
of Aboriginal title was never even considered throughout the development of
Australian property law. 01 This doctrine became obsolete in other former
British colonies, including the United States, 08 relatively early in those
nations' settlement histories. Each former colony recognized at least some
degree of native rights to land. However, terra nullius remained the status
quo in Australia for over 200 years.
All Australian settlers benefited from terra nullius to some degree.
Perhaps no group benefited more than those obtaining leases to mineral-rich
lands often inhabited by Aborigines. 19 The Australian Constitution was
amended in 1970 and limited the federal government of Australia to
acquiring property on "just terms." 110 In the case of Milirrpum v. Nabalco
Pty. Ltd., Aboriginal groups tried to use this constitutional limitation almost
immediately in an attempt to invalidate a mining lease granted on traditional
lands."' However, in speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Blackburn
refused to invalidate the lease and characterized native entitlement to land as
primarily "spiritual."" ' 2 This characterization "led him to conclude that the
rights asserted by the plaintiffs were not proprietary in nature, and so
incapable of recognition as interests in land." ' " 3 This validation was a huge
economic victory for holders of mining leases, won at the expense of native
title rights. The mining industry in Australia held on to these benefits
vigorously and aggressively campaigned against any native title recognition
for as long as it could."14 The campaign was successful for a long time.
Needless to say, the complete lack of recognition for any Aboriginal rights
thus became deeply entrenched throughout all of Australian society, making

"' See Patricia Lane, Native Title - The End of Property As We Know I?, 8 AUSTL. PROP. L.J. I, 2
(1999).
'07Richard H. Bartlett captured the essence of the situation:

The local colonial governments disregarded any concept of native title from their inception.
Traditional lands were granted to settlers without any agreement with, or payment of compensation
to, Aboriginal people. Dispossession was initiated and maintained by force. This dispossession
was such that almost no traditional land remains in the possession of Aboriginal people anywhere
in the settled and urban regions of Australia.
Richard H. Bartlett, Native Title in Australia in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA,
CANADA & NEW ZEALAND 408 (Paul Havemann ed., 1999).
8See Johnson v. M'Intosh 21 U.S. 543 (1832); See also Meyers & Raine, supra note 4, at 96 (Discussing
Chief Justice John Marshall's articulation, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, of what eventually became known as
the Native Title Doctrine, stating that indigenous inhabitants retain rights to own land and resources until
the new sovereign takes affirmative steps to extinguish those rights).
'oRONALD T. LIBBY, HAWKE'S LAW: THE POLITICS OF MINING AND ABORIGINAL LAND
RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA (1989).
AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §51 (xxxi).
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141.
,,Id. at 167.
113Lane, supra note 8, at 50.
11 LIBBY, supra note II, at 55-85 (detailing the specific 1980s campaign the mining industry launched in
Western Australia against native land rights and its general success in preventing the establishment of any
sort of native rights with respect to land ownership).
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what was to come all the more controversial and subject to vigorous
opposition.
B. The Mabo Decision and the 1993 Native Title Act
The highly controversial change that did in fact come, was a 1992
decision"' by the High Court of Australia and legislation, passed in 1993 in
response to the decision, 1 6 whereby Aborigines finally gained the hope of
obtaining some rights to their native land. In Mabo six of the seven justices
on Australia's High Court found that native title existed at common law,
although four justices (a majority) also held that title could be extinguished
by an inconsistent government grant of land without any compensation to, or
consent from, Aborigines." 7 Despite this qualification, the decision was seen
as a positive beginning for the recognition of Aboriginal property rights.
The decision required asking three broad questions to determine the
validity of indigenous claims to land: (a) does native title extend to the
relevant land; (b) has native title in that land been extinguished; (c) if native
title has not been extinguished, will the action comply with the Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975?118 In general, "native title is considered to
extend in accordance with the laws and customs of indigenous people where
those people have maintained their connection with the land and where their
title has not been extinguished by acts of Imperial, Colonial, State, Territory
or Commonwealth governments." 119 The decision allowed for the
extinguishing of a great deal of native title, but certainly not all. The existing
potential for Aborigines to acquire title to valuable land was made clear by
Justice Brennan, who stated that native title is extinguished "where the
Crown has validly alienated land by granting an interest that is wholly or
partially inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title, native title
is extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been
extinguished by grants of estates of freehold or of leases but not necessarily
120
by the grant of lesser interests (e.g., authorities to prospect for minerals).'
It is important to note that in instances where native title has not been
extinguished, any taken action with respect to land must comply with the
Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 (RDA). The Act generally prohibits racebased discrimination and entitles Aborigines to the same rights as all
Australians.12' With respect to native title, attention would have to be paid to
"'

Mabo v. Queensland [No 21(1992) 175 CLR I.
Act, 1993.
supra note 9, at 412-14 (analyzing Mabo and the various approaches taken by the justices).

116Native Title
17 See Bartlett,

"'Australian Government Solicitor, Legal Practice Briefing: Native Title (July 30, 1993), available at

www.ags.gov.au/publications/briefings/brO5.html (summarizing the major issues and holdings in Mabo).
119Id.
20

'

See Mabo (1992) 175 CLR I.

121Section

9(l) of the statute provides:
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paid for that effect
the effect of the action on native title, the compensation
122
title-holders.
native
to
accorded
procedures
the
and
Obviously, the government had to set up a system to apply the
Court's holding in Mabo and to administer the explosion of native claims
that was forthcoming. Its response was the 1993 Native Title Act (NTA).
The NTA addressed many issues, but for the purposes of this note, the most
significant were that the NTA:
*

Provided for the validation of past acts which may be invalid because of
the existence of native title;
Provided for a future regime in which native title rights are protected and
conditions imposed on affecting native title; and
Provided a process by which native title rights can be established and
compensation determined, and by which determinations can be made
23 as
to whether future grants can be made or acts done over native title.1

*
*

The Act also created the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) to receive
native title applications, to notify parties to those applications and to assist
applicants and parties to reach negotiated settlements. 24 Where agreements
could not be reached, applications were referred to Federal Court for
hearings. Most importantly, one should note "[t]he tribunal's primary
function was as a mediation service."' 125 It is sufficient at this point to note
that the 1993 NTA was considered as broad and providing for many possible

It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human
right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life.
Section 10(l) states:
If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, persons
of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by
persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a more limited extent
than persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, then, notwithstanding anything in
that law, persons of the first-mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall, by force of
this section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons of that other race, colour or national or
ethnic origin.
Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975, §§ 9(l) and 10(l).
122
See Australian Government Solicitor, supra note 17; see also Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175
CLR 1,61 (stating that native title "may be protected by such legal or equitable remedies as are
appropriate to the particular rights and interests established by the evidence..."); Western Australia v.
Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098 (noting that the preceding statement in Mabo has not yet been developed by
decisions and case law defining appropriate remedies).
123See Australian Government Solicitor, Legal Practice Briefing: Native Title Act 1993 (Apr. 29, 1994),
available at www.ags.gov.au/publications/briefings/br2O.html (outlining the provisions of the 1993 NTA
and its intended effect on the relationship between aborigines and the Australian government).
2'See Meyers, supra note 4, at 100.
125Id.
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opportunities for the native population of Australia. 126
The 1998
amendments changed
the
law
drastically
and
the
Act's
amendments
will be
127
examined below.
C. The Wik Case and the 1998 Amendments to the 1993 NTA
The NTA provided a systematic way for the government to deal with
the implications of Mabo. However, interpretation of the Act was still
necessary and questions of how exactly it would work were yet to be
determined. Cases brought seeking interpretation of the NTA, particularly
the Wik128 case, led to the government's decision to drastically change the
original NTA by enacting amendments, which took effect in 1998 and
29
severely limited the potential rights of the indigenous people of Australia.
In Wik, the High Court reaffirmed its decision in Mabo, recognizing
the existence of native title at common law. "More importantly, the Court
reaffirmed its view that native title was an interest in land that was capable of
co-existing with other interests in land."' 3 ° Specifically in terms of pastoral
leases, the High Court held that the granting of pastoral leases to private
parties did not extinguish Aboriginal rights insofar as the exercise of
Aboriginal rights could continue alongside authorized grazing.' 3' In the Wik
case, the Court found that native title was not extinguished by the granting of
a pastoral lease under a 1910 Queensland statute. 132 The decision was
obviously controversial since it directly pit Aboriginal rights against those of
pastoral leaseholders.
It also involved a great deal of land, since
approximately 42% of the proprietary interest in Australia consists of
pastoral leases. 133 Justice Toohey retreated somewhat from the seemingly
broad implications of the majority decision by adding that:

126See Bartlett, supra note 9, at 414-23 (discussing the general equality sought and achieved by Mabo,

Wik and the 1993 NTA and countering that notion of expanding Aboriginal rights with the 1998
amendments, which favored workability over equality).
29 See infra Part II.C.
3

"Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 A.L.R 129.
"' See Australians for Native Title & Reconciliation, The 'Ten Point Plan' and the 1998 Native Title Act
Amendments at http://www.antar.org.au/1998amend.html (confirming the fact that the amendments were
in direct response to Wik and calling the amendments "alarmist and discriminatory, predicated on winding
back native title rights previously recognized by [Wik]." ).
32 Maureen Tehan, Co-Existence of Interests in Land: A Dominant Feature of the Common
Lav,
AUSTRALIAN

INSTITUTE OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER STUDIES,

January 1997, at

http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/ntpapers/ntip l 2.pdf.
131See S. James Anaya, Maya Aboriginal Land and Resource Rights and the Conflict Over Logging in
Southern Belize, I YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 17,44 (1998).
132Land Act, 1910 (Queensl.).
35 See Garth Nettheim, Responding to Wik: First, Define the Problem, INDIGENOUS L. BULL., Apr.
1997, at 20.
36
See Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R at 190.
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47

whether there was extinguishment can only be
determined by reference to such particular rights and
interests as may be asserted and established. If inconsistency
is held to exist between the rights and interests conferred by
native title and the rights conferred under the statutory grants,
those rights and interests
must yield, to that extent, to the
34
rights of the grantees.1
Despite this statement, Wik was generally considered an expansion of Mabo
135
and the NTA and beneficial for Aborigines seeking to establish land rights.
Calls for change came almost immediately. Pastoral leaseholders
feared Wik would result in their property rights being significantly
devalued. 136 Similarly, the mining industry feared that native title rights
could stymie legitimate mining development. 137 Even the Australian
government felt the original NTA may have gone too far and the government
desired a "more workable" Native Title Act. 138 As a result, years of
negotiations finally led to the enactment of the Native Title Amendment Act
(NTAA), which was originally conceived as the Australian Government's
"Ten Point Plan" in response to the Wik case, and went into effect in 1998.
One major change the NTAA created was the significant limitation
placed on Aborigines' so-called right to negotiate, "a procedural right which
gives native title holders the opportunity to negotiate on proposed
developments (future acts) affecting native title land.' 39 First, Section 43 of
the NTAA allows states and territories to eliminate the right to negotiate by
creating minimum standards well below the original NTA. Specifically,
Section 43 provides:
(1) If: (a) a law of a State or Territory provides for
alternative provisions to those contained in this Subdivision
37See
38See,
9

Bartlett, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Meyers, supra note 4, at 13.

Id. at 115.

See E3 International, Aboriginal Property Rights & the Australian Mining Industry at
www.ethree.com.au/old/pdf/BP-No-20OAboriginalPropertyRights and the Mininglndus
try.pdf . E3 International (Environment Economics & Ethics) is a self proclaimed "hybrid
organization dedicated to making the business case for sustainable development." The author
of the cited paper discussed the government's reasons for proposing the NTA amendments:
40

The amendments set out to remove some of the uncertainty surrounding native title legislation in
Australia and purport to balance the views of industry against indigenous interests. The
amendments do have a pragmatic focus on statutory and administrative practicalities, however, the
public debate has been marred by controversy and no small mount of bigoted debate, with scare
tactics very much to the fore.
See id.
1 See Australians for Native Title & Reconciliation, supra note 31.
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in relation to some or all acts to which this Subdivision
applies that are attributable to the State or Territory; and (b)
the Commonwealth Minister determines in writing that the
alternative provisions comply with subsection (2); then,
provisions
while the determination is in force, the alternative
40
have effect instead of this Subdivision.
A second controversial aspect of the NTAA involved so-called
intermediate acts. From the time the original NTA was enacted (1993) until
the Wik decision (1996), the question of whether pastoral leases extinguish
native title was unclear. As a result, many Australian states and territories
granted pastoral leases under the assumption that native title was
extinguished. Wik decided that native title was not necessarily distinguished
by these leases. 141 The NTAA provisions 142 remedy this conflict by
providing that all rights and interests over pastoral leaseholds granted during
that three year period "would undergo blanket validation and extinguish
native title whether or not they would do so at common law.' 4 3 Aborigines
were particularly upset about these provisions since they rewarded states who
ignored the NTA at the expense of Indigenous groups. 144 Similar provisions
abound throughout the NTAA, generally making it much more difficult for
Indigenous groups to obtain land rights that seemed obtainable following
Wik. The entire process was made more difficult for Aboriginal groups, from
145
application for title all the way to final resolution.
The passage of the NTAA immediately met criticism from
Aboriginal groups, who argued that it went too far the other way and
eliminated too many of the rights that Aborigines had gained since 1992.
Many groups, including the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Racial
Discrimination (CERD), even found the Australian government in violation
of its international human rights obligations via the amendments. 46 What
angered pro-Aboriginal groups from the outset was that the entire Act was
"drawn up without the consent of, or consultation with, Indigenous
people.', 147 Therefore, while the NTAA provided some clarity at the expense
Native Title Amendment Act, 1998, §43.
See Wik (1996) 141 A.L.R 129; see also Bartlett, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
142See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998, Div. 2A.
13 See Meyers, supra note 4, at 118.
46 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Detailed Analysis of the Native Title Amendment Act
'4o
'

1998 available at www.atsic.gov.au/cultural/rsd.htm.
For a concise summary of the Ten Point Plan and its highlights see Michael Legg, Indigenous
Australians and International Law: Racial Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELY J.
INT'L L 387, 406 (2002) (generally standing for the proposition that the Ten Point Plan was a negative,
rather than a positive step, for native title rights).
'8 In March 1999, CERD issued a report criticizing the NTAA and its lack of recognition for Aboriginal
rights. A CERD press release from March 15, 1999 outlines the criticism. See United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cerd.htm.
49 See Australians for Native Title & Reconciliation, supra note 3 1.
4'
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of Aboriginal rights, there were still many left angered by the Act. Also, the
new Act still required further development, clarification and interpretation
through case law.
D. Leading up to the Ward Decision. Years of Uncertainty
While the NTAA may have been detrimental to the rights of
Indigenous people, it did not clarify many issues regarding native title for
either side of the debate. In a 2001 speech to the Cairns Chamber of
Commerce, Attorney General Daryl Williams acknowledged that "despite the
legislative response to the Mabo decision, the original Native Title Act and
the 1998 amendments, many native title issues remain unresolved. And a
range of practical difficulties remain in reaching agreements between
Indigenous groups, miners, pastoralists, the fishing industry and
governments. 1 48 The actual state of the law remained so uncertain that
Attorney General Williams urged both sides to reach agreements over land
use through mediation rather than costly, expensive and time consuming
litigation. 149 Of course, not all land use disputes could have possibly avoided
litigation and it seemed inevitable that the courts, just as they had with Mabo
and Wik, would again play a pivotal role in the determination of Indigenous
land rights.

III. THE AUGUST 8, 2002 DECISION
A. Backgroundof the Claim
In April 1994, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong people filed an
application with the NNTT seeking recognition of their native title rights
over an area of approximately 8,000 square kilometers located partly in the
East Kimberly region of Western Australia and partly in the Northern
Territory.150 Mediation between the Aboriginal groups and various business
interests proved unsuccessful, so the case was referred to the Federal Court in
1995. 5' On November 24, 1998 Justice Lee ruled that the Miriruwung
and
1 52
Gajerrong people held native title to a large portion of the claimed area.
148
Attorney General Daryl Williams, Speech to the Cairns Chamber of Commerce (September 12, 2001)
at

www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attUomeygenerahorme.nsf/page/speeches-2 I -speeches-the-impact of nativ
e title on miningexploration.html.
4See id. Attorney General Williams added, and the general consensus remains, that one of the most
beneficial changes brought about by the NTAA was the provision for creating Indigenous Land Use
Agreements (ILUAs) and thus avoiding litigation.
15"
National Native Title Tribunal, Background: Miriuwung and Gajerrong Case at www.nntt.gov.au.
1'1Id.
'See

generally Ward v. Western Australia (1998) 159 A.L.R 483 overruled by Western Australia v.

Ward (2002) 191 A.L.R. I; see also National Native Title Tribunal, supra note 52, summarizing Justice
Lee's major findings including that:
native title is not a bundle of rights but a right to land arising from connections with
the land;
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A variety of different business and government groups appealed the
decision on over 100 grounds and yet another decision was issued by the Full
Bench of the Federal Court on March 3, 2000.153 In that appeal, all three
judges upheld Justice Lee's finding that the Miriuwung and Gajerrong people
held native title to those parts of the claimed area where native title was not
extinguished. However, "by a 2:1 majority Justice Lee's findings in relation
to the nature of native title and the way it may be extinguished were
overturned. Their decision resulted' 54in a significant reduction in the area over
which native title was recognized."'
On August 4, 2000 the High Court granted leave to appeal on more
limited grounds than the parties had sought. 55 The hearing began on March
5, 2001 and lasted nine days. The decision of the High Court, which was
delivered on August 8, 2002, came 17 months after hearing the case and
eight years after the initial claim was made at an estimated cost of $10
million. 56 It was clear that there were many controversial issues the High
Court had to resolve, and before the High Court delivered its decision in the
case "the case was heralded as one of the most important cases since Mabo
and Wik. It was expected that the decision in the case would go some way
towards clarifying the nature and scope of native title."' 57 All that was left
for the Court to do was validate the advanced billing of the case - a task that
ultimately proved extremely difficult.

*
*
*

native title cannot be partially extinguished;
native title rights co-existed with non-native title interests in the area;
some co-existing native title rights could be regulated, controlled restricted or
suspended by Parliament or because other interests in the area had been created by
State or Territory but this did not extinguish those rights.
Lee also found that, among other things, where native title was recognized, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong
people had a right to:
0
possess, occupy, use and enjoy the area;
0
make decisions about the use and enjoyment of the area;
0
access the area;
0
control the access of others to the area;
0
use and enjoy resources of the area;
0
receive a portion of any resources taken by others from the area;
0
maintain and protect places of importance under traditional laws, customs and
practices in the area.
153id.
15'National Native Title Tribunal, supra note 52.
15Id.

Mark Metherell, Native Title Decision Puts Aborigines on the Back Foot, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002 available at www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/08/1028157991712.html.
'" See Dr. Lisa Strelein, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Lands.
Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title available at www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/ntpapers/lPv2n I 7.pdf
(Jessica Weir, ed., Aug. 2002).
'5
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51

B. Highlights of the Ward Decision
Prior to even beginning any native title analysis, the High Court was
faced with the initial issue of what law to apply. Relevant legislation
(including the NTA, RDA and various legislation of Western Australia and
the Northern Territory) was amended in some respects between the time of
the original application (1994) and the decision of the Full Court (2000).158
The Full Court refused to incorporate various state laws that had already
been enacted at the time of the appeal, into its decision. The Full Court
based this decision on two older Australian cases, 159 standing for the
proposition that the Full Court must "consider and apply the law as it stood at
the date of the hearing at first instance, and not at the date of hearing of the
appeal.' 160 The High Court overruled the precedent of Durallaand Petreski
in determining what law to apply. It stated that the Full Court erred in
concluding that it could not take account of the State Validation Act 161 and
the NTAA. The Court added that an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal
Court is not an appeal in the strict sense and the relevant State and Territory
law should apply. 162 As a result, the more recent State and Territory
legislation would apply, along with the NTAA and the RDA.
Upon resolution of the initial issue of what law applies in the case,
the Court proceeded to announce the central issues of the case, which Chief
Justice Gleeson described as "whether there could be partial extinguishment
of native title rights and interests, and what principles should be adopted in
determining whether native title rights and interests have been extinguished
in whole or in part."' 163 Obviously, these issues are framed extremely broadly,
and they touch upon virtually every issue related to native title and
Aboriginal rights to land. It is clear from this framing why the decision was
so highly anticipated. 64
Before it could turn to the specific issues in the Ward case, 165 the
Court also felt compelled to clarify the confusion with regard to analyzing
native title cases generally. It focused on two points of clarification: the
proper criteria for determining whether native title exists and the proper

158See Australian Legal Information Institute, Western Australia v. Ward- Statement at
http://beta.austlii.edu.au/au/special/hca/wardstatement.html (briefly summarizing the August 8 decision
and the events leading up to it).
'5 Duralla Pty. Ltd. V. Plant (1984) 54 A.L.R 29; Petreski v. Cargill (1987) 79 A.L.R 235.
'6" See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R 159.
262 State Validation Act, 1999 (W. Austl.). This was the specific statute in question when the High Court
its decision. It went into effect on December 13, 1999.
Made
6
1 1 See Ward(2002) 76 A.L.R 1098, 1121.
263 Id. at 1105
26 See Strelein, supra note 59.
165This note will analyze the Court's approach to specific native title issues involving mining leases and

control over natural resources, such as petroleum, on disputed land. There are numerous other issues the
Court addressed in its decision, including issues of fishing rights, pastoral leases and vacant Crown land.
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criteria in determining whether there has been extinguishment of that native
title. In determining whether native title exists, the Court first applied the
definition of native title, as set out by the NTA. 166 This was done out of the
Court's concern for both parties' reliance on case law as opposed to the NTA,
in arguing their claims. The statutory definition focuses on traditional laws
and customs in finding the existence of native title rights and interests in land.
The Court emphasized that the NTA, not the common law, is the
source of relevant native title rights and interests and added that common law
is given its appropriate importance in subsection (c) of §223 in determining
whether native title exists. With this seemingly broad definition of native title
in hand, the Court added that native title may cease to exist in circumstances
where traditional customs clash with general goals of societal safety and
preservation, or where native title has been deemed extinguished, based on
the criteria for extinguishment the Court sets forth below. The main purpose
of this first clarification by the Court was to emphasize that the NTA, and not
the statements made by judges via the case law, would rule the day in native
title analysis.
The second clarification the Court felt compelled to make was one
involving the appropriate test to apply in determining whether native title,
The Court
having been established, was ultimately extinguished.
acknowledged that "[b]efore the changes made by the 1998 Act, which came
into effect after the institution of the present litigation, the NTA itself
otherwise indicated little about what was involved in the notion of
extinguishment of native title."1 67 The 1998 amendments to the NTA go
somewhat further by distinguishing between complete, permanent

'66

Section 223 of the NTA defines native title and the language is identical under the NTAA:

(1) The expression "native title" or "native title rights and interests" means the communal, group or
individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land
or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection
with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
(2) Without limiting subsection (I), "rights and interests" in that subsection includes hunting,
gathering, or fishing, rights and interests.
See Native Title Act, 1993, §223; See also Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1109 (where the Court elaborated
on the NTA definition by adding that the "cultural knowledge in question may be possessed under the
traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples. The issue which
then arises is whether, by those laws and customs, there is 'a connection with' that land or waters in
question.").
67
1 See Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1110.
"0"The word 'extinguish', in relation to native title, means permanently extinguish the native title. To
avoid any
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extinguishment of native title and partial inconsistency. 68 The arguments of
both sides focused upon questions of extinguishment and not whether native
title existed in the first place. This fact necessitated that the High Court
address, modify and clarify the various tests applied in the lower courts,
which yielded vastly different results.
The Court expressly rejected Justice Lee's (recall that he was the
first judge to hear the case, at the Federal Court level) use of the adverse
dominion test in determining extinguishment, which resulted in Lee's
recognition of native title rights over a great deal of the claimed area. The
test had been mentioned as a possibility in a dissenting opinion of an earlier
Canadian case, 169 but had never been endorsed by the Australian courts.
Nonetheless, Justice Lee applied the test, which consisted of three
requirements:
First, that there be a clear and plain expression of
intention by parliament to bring about extinguishment in that
manner; secondly, that there be an act authorized by the
legislation which demonstrates the exercise of permanent
adverse dominion as contemplated by the legislation; and
thirdly, unless the legislation provides the extinguishment
arises on the creation of the tenure inconsistent with an
aboriginal right, there must be actual use made of the land
by the holder of the tenure which is permanently inconsistent
with the continued existence of aboriginal title or right and
not merely a temporary suspension thereof. 7 °
This test is obviously a very difficult one for non-aboriginal leaseholders in
land to meet and it is easy to see why, based on this test for extinguishment,
Justice Lee reached the extremely pro-aboriginal decision that he did. On
appeal to the Full Court, the majority rejected the adverse dominion test and
over most of the claimed area had been wholly
found that native title rights
71
or partially extinguished.
For the most part, the High Court, in its decision, agreed with the test
the Full Court used and severely criticized the adverse dominion test as
doubt, this means that after the extinguishment the native title rights and interests cannot revive, even if
the act that caused the extinguishment ceases to have effect." See Native Title Amendment Act, 1998,
§237(A).
169See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993) 104 DLR (4"') 470, 670-2 (Justice Lambert of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal describing the adverse dominion test).
72See Ward(1998) 159 A.L.R at 508.
" See Ward(2000) 170 A.L.R 159.
71See Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1122 (citing Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR
373, 423 as support for those that argue that the adverse dominion test is a simple re-phrasing of the
existing test for extinguishment).
71See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 183.
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applied by Justice Lee. Plaintiffs in the case had argued that the adverse
dominion test is really nothing more than a different way to phrase an
extinguishment test that was essentially the existing law in Australia. The
High Court even conceded the fact that native title cases often refer to the
"need for those who contend that native title has been extinguished to
demonstrate a 'clear and plain intention' to do so. '' 172 However, the Court
refused to accept the plaintiffs' construction of the adverse dominion test and
proceeded to apply the inconsistency of incidents test, as articulated by the
Full Court, as the appropriate test in determining extinguishment.
As stated by the majority of the Full Court, the inconsistency of
incidents test "requires a comparison between the legal nature and incidents
of the statutory right which has been granted and the native title rights being
asserted. The question is whether the statutory right is inconsistent with the
continuance of native title rights and interests.' 73 The High Court felt this
comparative test more accurately accounted for the comparative rights being
asserted and was the most just way to determine extinguishment. However,
while the Full Court applied the inconsistency of incidents test to hold that
much of the native title rights asserted had been extinguished, the High
Court, applying the same test, was not necessarily willing to go so far.
Specifically, the Court's application of the test to mining leases and natural
resources resulted74in a more middle ground approach and will be addressed
later in this note.'

The High Court also disagreed with the articulation of the
inconsistency of incidents test as stated by Justice North, a dissenting justice
of the Full Court who applied a variation of the test. He reached a different
result than the majority by saying the degree of inconsistency in the case was
not sufficient to extinguish native title.' 75 North refused to accept the fact
that "a minor or insignificant inconsistency between the rights or interests
created and native title could not lead to such a far reaching consequence as
total abrogation of native title."' 176 The High Court refused to accept this
approach. The majority felt that there was no such thing as degrees of
inconsistency. "Two rights are inconsistent or they are not. If they are
inconsistent, there will be extinguishment to the extent of the inconsistency;
if they are not, there will not be extinguishments ... Questions of suspension
of one set of rights in favor of another do not arise." 177 The essential
requirement should be to identify and compare one set of rights deriving

'

See infra Part IIl. A-B.

'"See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 328-9.
v See id. (Justice North giving an example of how to apply his version of the inconsistency of incidents
test by saying that where native title is a permanent right to land, only a law that has permanent adverse
consequences to the existence of a right to land would extinguish native title).
17See Ward(2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1124.
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from traditional law and custom with another set of rights deriving from the
exercise of sovereign authority that came with settlement.,78 Therefore, the
High Court adopted the test as articulated by the majority of the Full Court.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that, in determining
whether native title exists or has been extinguished, there must be a factual
inquiry made into what constitutes "traditional laws and customs." It is an
essential inquiry both in examining the statutory definition of native title and
in applying the inconsistency of incidents test in determining extinguishment.
The High Court seized the opportunity presented by the Ward case to clarify
proper application of traditional knowledge as well. At issue specifically
was the determination made by Justice Lee at the Federal Court level,
designated as paragraph 3(j). In that determination, Justice Lee found that a
native title right included "a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse
of cultural knowledge of the common law holders associated with the
determination area." 179 This determination and great recognition for
traditional knowledge of aboriginal groups was a key contributing factor in
his generally broad granting of native title rights.
Once again, the Full Court took a radically different approach than
Justice Lee. In fact, the majority of the Full Court omitted any section
resembling 3(j), holding that:
although the relationship of Aboriginal people to
their land has a religious or spiritual dimension, we do not
think that a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse
of cultural knowledge is a right in relation to land of the 8kind
0
that can be the subject of a determination of native title.
The restoration of 3(j) was one of many grounds for plaintiffs' appeal,
however, since Justice Lee's determination was based on a test for
extinguishment that the Full Court refused to accept (the adverse dominion
test discussed earlier in this section), the Full Court was reluctant to reinstate
3(j) on that basis.
The primary criticism of Justice Lee's ruling was that it was too
broad, over-inclusive and did not truly adhere to the more narrow parameters
of the NTA. The High Court, in agreeing with the Full Court, felt that native
title rights protected by section 223 of the NTA are rights related to land or
water and where aboriginal groups, through traditional laws and customs,
have a connection to the land or water in question. However, the rights
asserted by the plaintiffs in this case and recognized by Justice Lee in 3(j) go
8

17

id.

"' See Ward(1998) 159 A.L.R 483.

- See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 321.
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beyond the scope of section 223 "to something approaching an incorporeal
right akin to a new species of intellectual property to be recognized by the
common law under §223(1)(c)."'' The right asserted included reference to
viewing or reproduction of secret ceremonies, artwork, songs and narratives,
and such matters, according to the Full Court, go beyond issues establishing
a connection to the land. It is essential to acknowledge that a fundamental
principle of the Australian legal system is that the ownership of land and
ownership of artistic works are separate statutory and common law
institutions, 182 with the latter cases being more appropriately dealt with under
copyright and intellectual property case law, as opposed to native title case
law.183 This analysis by the Full Court clarifies that issues of traditional
knowledge and customs are to be limited to matters affecting connection to
the land.
That is not to say that there is universal agreement with the High
Court's treatment of these "intellectual property" matters as separate entities
having nothing to do with connection to the land. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Kirby felt that according to aboriginal beliefs, cultural knowledge is
sufficiently related to the land for purposes of the NTA and is within the
scope of section 223. According to Justice Kirby, the critical question is
whether there is a right "in relation to" land or water. That phrase is
obviously very broad. 8 4 He felt the majority did not sufficiently consider
aboriginal tradition and the well-established principle that native title is
unique and should not be restricted to rights with precise common law
equivalents. Despite this highly plausible articulation by Justice Kirby, the
more narrow view by the majority was ultimately accepted. 5
All of these clarifications, which the High Court felt were necessary,
resulted in a variety of tests, applications and definitions that had not
previously been used. All that remained was for the Court to apply these
newly announced principles. As a result, rather than apply the principles
themselves, the Court decided to remand most issues back to the full court
for further consideration.' 8 6 Still, the High Court's statements, as related to
"'
82

See Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1120.
See Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd. (1998) 157 A.L.R 193, 204.

183
See id; see also Foster v. Mountford and Rigby Ltd. (1976) 14 A.L.R 71.
' See Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1212 (Justice Kirby referring to the broad application of the phrase

"in relation to" as applied in prior Australian cases. Specifically, he referred to O'Grady v. Northern
Queensland Co. Ltd. (1990) 92 A.L.R 213, at 221 where the phrase was held to require a relevant
relationship, having regard to the scope of the act. This is obviously a very broad construction of the
phrase).
15 Id. at 1192.
186 In its "Orders and Further Proceedings" section, the High Court stated:
the whole of the order of the Full Court made on I I May 2000 and the determination of native title
made on I I May 2000 should be set aside and the matters remitted to the Full Court for further
hearing and determination. It will be necessary for the Full Court to consider the various questions
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some specific matter such as mining leases and petroleum rights, did allow
for some partial clarity on those highly controversial issues.
C. Specifics of Mining Leases
All of the general areas of native title analysis that the Court
addressed and established allowed it to apply the general principles it had
just announced to some specific areas of dispute in the case, including the
highly controversial battle over mining leases. The High Court's specific
rulings pertaining to mining leases, 8 7 at least on the surface, seem like a
victory for Indigenous land rights. However, when coupled with its ruling on
ownership and control of natural resources, 88 the mining rulings are actually
very minor victories, if victories at all. The dispute over mining rights in
Ward involved fifty-two mining leases, which were granted over land within
the claim area,18 9 and all of the leases in question were granted pursuant to a
Western Australian mining statute. 190 There were various specific leases
involved in the case, however the Court decided to initially examine the
extinguishing effect (if any) of the mining leases in general before deciding
whether any different result should be reached with respect to certain specific
leases.' 9'
In general, the High Court ruled that the Mining Act granted
exclusive possession for mining purposes only. "That is, they grant a right to
exclude others from mining. This does not give the leaseholder the right to
exclude native title holders from access to and use of the land."', 92 This stance
was essentially a middle ground between the Federal Court ruling, which
held that no native title rights were extinguished, 193 and the ruling by the Full
Court, which held that all native title rights with respect to land held by
mining leases were extinguished. 194 The High Court added that the full
extinguishment granted by the Full Court "misconstrues the principles
respecting extinguishment by grant of inconsistent right."' 95 The High Court
to which reference has been made in these reasons and for that purpose to make such further
findings of fact as the evidence permits.
See Ward(2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1194-5.
187The grant by the Crown of a mining lease has been described as "really a sale by the Crown of minerals
reserved to the Crown to be taken by the lessee at a price payable over a period of years as royalties." See
Wade v. New South Wales Rutile Mining Co. Pty. Ltd. (1969) 121 CLR 177, at 192.
" See infra Part III.D.
's9See Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1162.
190Mining Act, 1978 (W. Austl.).
9
' ' See Ward(2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1163.
92See Strelein, supra note 59, at page 6.
'9 See Ward (1998) 159 A.L.R at 580 (Justice Lee held that "it cannot be said that in granting this interest
the Crown did not evince a clear and plain intention to extinguish native title.").
'9' See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 301 (The majority held that the statutory scheme in question
"establishes a regime which has an intended operation which, in the absence of explicit provision to the
contrary (and none is relevantly to be found here) is inconsistent with the use or occupation of the lands
leased by any other person").
'9' See Ward(2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1167.
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felt that neither view properly interpreted or applied the criteria for
extinguishment, 196 and therefore, neither was an accurate statement with
respect to the mining leases in question.
The Court refused to accept the fact that a valid mining lease
The majority
necessarily extinguished all native title in the area.
acknowledged that "the grant of exclusive possession for mining purposes is
directed at preventing others from carrying out mining and related activities
on the relevant land."' 97 It did not follow, according to the Court, that this
granted exclusive possession to the entire lease area. Of course, using the
land for "mining activities" is a broad concept and includes activities that go
beyond merely taking minerals out of the ground. 198 The general nature of
the rulings by both lower courts with respect to mining leases made it
impossible for the High Court to come up with specific rulings as to the
extent of native title rights that have been extinguished on the disputed
mining areas. 199 The Court ruled that more findings had to be made in
accordance with the new criteria for extinguishment set forth (including how
broadly to interpret whether land is being used for "mining purposes"),
before definitive rulings could be made with respect to where native title
rights have or have not been extinguished. There was one exception to this
ruling, in an area where the Court was able to find that all native title had
been extinguished - the area was native title right to control access to the
land. The Court found that such a right "is inconsistent with the rights of
access arising under the mining lease., 200 This finding seems to make sense
because a right to mine on a parcel of land is worthless if access to that land
could be denied.
Despite a native right to control access being denied, the general
finding by the Court, that native title is not necessarily inconsistent with
mining leases and those leases do not extinguish all rights, was a positive one
for Indigenous groups. The Court seems to have acknowledged Indigenous
rights to land and a right of Aborigines to maintain their spiritual and cultural
connection with the land, even in the face of mining projects commencing
around them. They are permitted to continue to use and enjoy the land
without interference and holders of mining leases have no right to remove
Aboriginal groups holding valid native title from the land. While this is
certainly a start, it is far from all that Aboriginal groups were hoping for from
the ruling.

See supra Part III.B.
Ward (2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1167.
"8 See Fed. Comm'r of Taxation v. BHP Co. Ltd. (1969) 120 CLR 240.
99
' See Ward(2002) 76 ALJR 1098, 1173.
1

'97See

2 0 Id.
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D. Ownership and Control of NaturalResources
The Court's rulings relating to Aboriginal ownership and control of
resources significantly limits the rights that Aboriginal groups may have won
with respect to mining leases generally. Once again, the High Court was
forced to find some common ground between the Federal Court's holding
that native title included the right to use and enjoy minerals, 20 1 and the
Full Court holding that native title with respect to minerals had been
completely extinguished.0 2 The Court's ultimate holding on the matter was
twofold: (a) that native title rights to minerals were never established and
thus never existed; and (b) even if native title rights had existed, those rights
were extinguished by relevant state legislation. Either way, the end result
was that Indigenous groups were not entitled to any ownership rights in
minerals or petroleum on those lands where mining leases had been granted
and native title had not necessarily been extinguished.
In answering these questions, the main piece of legislation the Court
looked to was the Mining Act of 1904. Section 117 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations (1)
Gold, silver, and other precious metals on or below
the surface of all land in Western Australia, whether
alienated or not alienated from the Crown, and if alienated
whensoever alienated, are the property of the Crown.
(2)
All other minerals on or below the surface of any
land in Western Australia which was not alienated in fee
simple from the Crown before the first day of January, One
thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, are the property of
the crown.
Similar language was used in legislation related to petroleum.20 4 Before
examining whether or not there was extinguishment of title, the Court
20 See Ward (1998) 159 A.L.R at 639 (holding that native title holders have "the right to use and enjoy

resources of the area, the right to control the use and enjoyment of others of resources of the area, the right
to trade in resources of the area and the right to receive a portion of any resources taken by others").
202See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 290 (holding that the interests in minerals and petroleum in this case
amounted to "full beneficial ownership, and that accordingly any native title that may have existed in
relation to minerals or petroleum has been extinguished").
203Mining Act, 1904, §117 (I)-(2).
204The relevant part of the Petroleum Act provides that:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any act, or any grant, lease, or other
instrument of title, whether made or issued before or after the commencement of this act, all
petroleum on or below surface of all land within the State, whether alienated in fee simple or not so
alienated from the Crown is and shall be deemed always to have been property of the Crown.
See Petroleum Act, 1936, §9.
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reasoned (as they had earlier with all issues of extinguishment in general),
that there must first be an inquiry into, and attempt to identify, any native
title right or interest that is at issue. 20 5 The claimants alleged that they had
dug for and used stones, ochres 20 6 and minerals on and from the land and that
they shared and traded resources from the land, thereby establishing a
cultural .connection with the land. 20 7 Despite these claims, the Full Court had
held:
that there was no evidence of any traditional
Aboriginal law, custom or use relating to petroleum either in
the state or in the territory. Nor, assuming ochre is not a
mineral, was there any evidence of any traditional
Aboriginal law, custom or use relating to any of the
substances dealt with in either the Mining Act 1904 or the
WA Mining Act (No partsy contended that ochre fell within
the relevant definitions).
The High Court, in applying its examination of cultural connection to the
land prior to even addressing the extinguishment issue, essentially agreed
with the Full Court's assessment. Based on the claims made by the
Miriuwung and Gajerrong people, the Court held that no question of
extinguishment even arose in this matter, since "no relevant native title right
or interest was established. 2 °9
Criticism about this aspect of the decision came almost immediately.
The Court's reasoning has been referred to as "troubling" and has been
questioned as to why this was the "only foray the Court took into discussing
the proof of particular rights and interests. 210° The specific criticism has
been that the Court failed to look at the rights from the Indigenous groups'
perspective. The failure to do so, it has been argued, takes too narrow a view
of native rights and customs so that the Court could only validate very old
State legislation.2 ' It is unclear what the Court's motivation was on this
205See Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1179.
2

'oSee WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COMPACT DICTIONARY 297 (1st ed. 1995) (defining ochre as "a
yellow or reddish-brown clay containing iron").
20"See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 290 (discussing the various claims made by the Miriuwung and
in "pretrial particulars").
Gajerrong
2
. See Ward (2000) 170 A.L.R at 292-3.
2

"9See Ward (2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1179.
Strelein, supra note 59.

112See

211According

to Dr. Strelein:

The Court has taken a vary narrow view of the subject matter to which laws and customs apply. A
general native title right to use the resources of the land, whether on or below the surface, was not
considered sufficient to establish a right to minerals. It is one thing to resolve a conflict in relation
to a specific interest asserted by the Crown by confirming that no native title right to minerals can
survive. However, it is another to require that such an assessment legitimizes the finding of a
particular law in relation to particular sub-surface minerals.
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matter. It is indeed curious that the issue of minerals (and petroleum) was
the only one in which the Court played an active role in examining specific
proof problems that the Miriuwung and Gajerrong had in establishing
traditional rights. Perhaps, as the cynic would argue, it was solely an
affirmation of interests that the mining industry held in order to provide some
clarity to an industry that is a major part of the Australian economy. 21 2 Or,

perhaps the Court felt that the mining legislation and the lack of evidence
presented by the Indigenous groups combined to justify its closer look into
native title rights with respect to minerals. Whatever the Court's motivation
may have been, the end result was a blow to native title rights.
In any event, the Court tried to soften the blow of its controversial
ruling by saying that a finding of native title rights would have made no
difference with respect to the claims made. The Court used the Mining Act
of 1904 in conjunction with the Petroleum Act of 1936 to hold that even if
some native title rights to minerals were established, those rights would be
extinguished. The right of the state of Western Australia to establish its own
policies as to the disposal of minerals was established early on, in its state
constitution. 2 13 According to the Court, reserving the minerals to the Crown,
as property, had two consequences: "(a) First, upon alienation of land, all
minerals under the land would remain vested in the Crown; and (b) the
Crown could deal with minerals separately from the land and could grant
separate rights to search for and recover them." 214 The Court held that native
title was extinguished under these facts and distinguished this case from
Yanner v. Eaton, 215 where the High Court held that Queensland fauna
legislation, which gave the State an ownership right to wildlife, did not
extnguish native title rights to the wildlife.2 6 Unlike that fauna legislation,
the Court here felt that:
The vesting of property in minerals was no mere
fiction expressing the importance of the power to preserve
and exploit these resources. Vesting of property and minerals
was the conversion of the radical title to land which was
taken at sovereignty to full dominion over the substances in

Id.

. See infra Part IV.B.

213The

relevant provision states that: "the entire management and control of the waste lands of the Crown

in the colony of Western Australia, and of the proceeds of the sale, letting, and disposal thereof including
all royalties, mines, and minerals, shall be vested in the legislature of that colony," W. AUSTL. CONST.
ACT, §3 (1890) (emphasis added).
214
See Ward(2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1179.
213Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 166 A.L.R 258.
216
See id; see also Meyers, supra note 4, at 109 (noting that "the Court held that such legislation did not
intend to assert more than the State's paramount public interests in its wildlife nor did it thereby express a
clear intention to assume all beneficial interests in that wildlife and consequently extinguish any native
title").
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quesion no matter whether the substances were on or under
alienated or unalienated land. 17
On this distinction, the Court found native title, with respect to minerals and
petroleum, would be extinguished.
The distinction drawn seems tenuous. Both statutes seem to
similarly grant ownership rights in resources (minerals v. fauna) to the
Crown. It seems difficult to call one piece of legislation granting ownership
a "fiction," and another a legitimate ownership right. Nonetheless, the
tenuous distinction is purely hypothetical and less controversial than the
earlier ruling that extinguishment never even arose as a question. In any
event, the main point is that no Indigenous rights to minerals and petroleum
exist. Obviously, this is a major economic victory for the mining industry
and a severe blow to the cultural and potentially great economic
opportunities for Indigenous groups. More specific analysis of the218effects of
the Court's ruling with respect to mining will be addressed below.
IV. THE FUTURE OF NATIVE TITLE: WHAT THE DECISION WILL MEAN
A. Initial Reaction to the Decision
Initial reaction to the ruling by the Australian news media has been
one of disappointment over the decision and has involved a focus on the
rights lost by Aborigines. A common belief throughout the media seems to
be that "while superficially supporting the case that native title rights can coexist with pastoral and mining leases, in practical terms the ruling excludes
traditional owners from exercising significant land-use or ownership rights in
these circumstances."2 9 Most observers in the media feel the ruling was a
major blow to the high hopes of aborigines following the Mabo decision just
10 years earlier. As one newspaper column put it: "to the extent that
Aboriginal people allowed themselves to hope that native title might pry
open the treasure trove of Australia's mineral wealth, those hopes are
gone. 22 ° In addition to criticizing the decision for its seemingly unjust
treatment of aboriginal groups, media complaints also focused on the failure
of the native title process as a whole and the High Court's inability to clarify
anything through its ruling. 221 Despite the fact that the decision provided
217

See Ward(2002) 76 AUR 1098, 1179.
...
See infra Part IV.B.
219 See Sean Martin-Iverson, Miriuwung-Gajerrong People Win Limited Native Title Rights, GREEN
LEFT WEEKLY, Aug. 21, 2002, at 6, available at www.greenleft.org.au/back/2002/505/505p6.htm.
While Green Left Weekly is a self-proclaimed "radical" weekly paper, the views expressed in the cited
article represent a fair articulation of reaction to the decision by the "mainstream" media in Australia.
22
See Stuart Rintoul, 'Bundle of Rights' But Miners Still Hold Sway, THE AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 9 2002,
at 2.
221 See A Better Way Needed on Native Title Claims, THE AGE (MELBOURNE), Aug. 12, 2002, at l0
the process has so far failed
("the process for determining native title is costly, slow and unwieldy and ...
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some legal clarifications, following the seemingly polar opposite rulings of
the two lower courts, it still was not considered "a ringing endorsement for
the way the native title regime has been conducted over the past decade with years of protracted litigation costing many hundreds of millions of
dollars in real costs and millions more in lost opportunities. 222
The media is hardly the only group that has voiced its opinions.
Initial reaction to the decision by parties with specific interest in the case has
been mixed. Aborigines and those sympathetic to their cause have generally
expressed confusion and extreme disappointment. Ben Ward, the Miriuwung
elder and leader of the plaintiffs was obviously disappointed, saying the
government and courts continue to confuse matters and that the entire native
title regime in Australia needs to be reexamined.22 3 Others, such as Aden
Ridgeway, the only Aborigine Senator in the Federal Parliament, stressed
that the decision was not only bad for Aborigines, but also hurt the mining
industry, despite the industry's overall praise of the ruling.22 4 Many legal
analysts were also critical of the Court for failing to provide the clarity that
seemed inevitable when the case first reached the High Court.225 Based on
the outcome of the decision, the type of disappointment and frustration
expressed by those sympathetic to aboriginal causes can hardly be considered
surprising.
On the other hand, the Australian government and various industrial
interests, specifically the mining industry, have seen the decision as mostly
positive, but still had some reservations about it, especially its overall
confusion and lack of clarity. For example, the Honorable Geoff Gallop,
Premier of Western Australia, called the ruling a "significant case and the
findings of the High Court go a long way toward clarifying the nature and

to deliver certainty to indigenous people, many of whom are still waiting to reap the benefits they believed
would flow from a recognition of their rights).
222See Rintoul, supra note 122.
223See Metherell, supra note 58 (Ward complaining that "the government should make it more simple for
people to live more simply out in the bush because we pay the tax too"); see also, e.g., Press Release, Dr.
Carmen Lawrence, Minister for Reconciliation, Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (Aug. 9, 2002)
at
www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/news-and-notes/miriuwung-gajerrong/miriuwungavailable
gajerrong.htm ("on the face of it, these decisions appear to further limit native title, confirming the
reduction of the strength and extent of such rights. They represent a significant erosion of the title
envisaged in the original Native Title Act").
224See Metherell, supra note 58. (Senator Ridgeway stating that the ruling has "provided certainty to no
one and far too much energy and money had been spent trying to constrain and restrict the application of
native title").
225Dr. Strelein lamented that:
Rather than espouse a coherent theory of native title, the Court instead concentrated on the complex
web of statute law that now frames native title and articulated the process for determining the
relationship between native title and other interests. The Court concentrated on the intricacies of
determining the extinguishing effects of 200 years of dealing with Indigenous peoples' land without
consideration of property rights.
See Strelein, supra note 59.
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extent of native title. 22 6 Prime Minister John Howard, speaking for the
Australian Government, expressed similar satisfaction with the ruling. 227 The
mining industry was pleased for the most part as well. The Minerals Council
of Australia welcomed the decision as a key precedent confirming that
minerals and petroleum in the ground are the property of the Crown,
providing some certainty for the mining industry in its dealings with
indigenous groups. 228 However, not everyone in the industry shared the
Council's enthusiasm. For example, the Queensland Mining Council agreed
that the decision provided some clarity but added that it would do nothing to
resolve the issue of more than 1000 back logged exploration permit
applications and those issues will have to be resolved in separate litigation. 229
Others benefiting from the ruling, like Pastoralists and Graziers Association
President Barry Court, actually felt the decision did not go far enough, and
were upset that the High Court left open any possibility of native title
existing. 230 Still, the prevailing mining industry reaction to the decision was
a positive one.
B. Ward's Effect on the Future
All of these vastly different reactions to the historic ruling have left
affected Australians asking "where do we go from here?" The answer, of
course, is that no one really knows. While the High Court found mining
leases under relevant Western Australian legislation to have extinguished
native title in the case before it, that ruling does not necessitate that native
title with relation to other mining leases pursuant to different statutory
language would yield an identical result. As Maureen Tehan, a professor at
Melbourne University Law School and native title expert puts it, the practical
result of the decision in relation to mining issues is that it "will require
Courts to be much more detailed in terms of findings about the specific
nature of each and every Native Title right in relation to a piece of land." 23'
226See

generally, Press Release, Hon. Geoff Gallop, Premier, Minister for Public Sector Management,

Federal Affairs, Science, Citizenship and Multicultural Interests (Aug. 8, 2002) available at
www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au (Despite a generally positive view of the decision, Premier Gallop also
acknowledged that indigenous groups would be disappointed because "not all of their expectations had
been met").
22 See Goldsmith, supra note 6 (quoting Prime Minister Howard as saying that "on first blush it looks as
though it has provided a degree of stability and predictability, particularly in the area of mining leases").
228See Press Release, Mitchell H. Hooke, Chief Executive, Minerals Council of Australia (Aug. 8, 2002),
available at www.minerals.org.au.
229See John McCarthy, Permit Backlog Remains In Place, COURIER MAIL, Aug. 9, 2002, at 7 (QMC Chief
We are just back
Executive Michael Pinnock complaining that the decision "[Hias not changed anything ...
to where we were after the Wik decision").
230See Iverson, supra note 121.
231Interview by Damien Carrick with Maureen Tehan, Senior Lecturer, Melbourne University Law School,
at
(Aug.
13,
2002)
available
Irving,
Perth
Barrister
and
George
www.abc.net.au/m/talks/8.30/lawrpt/stories/s645982.htm. Ms. Tehan's prediction almost immediately
proved to be accurate. On December 12, 2002, the High Court handed down its first post-Ward native title
decision when it decided Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002) HCA 58.
The High Court upheld the Federal Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim, saying that native title to the
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So while the Ward decision was a good result for the mining industry, its true
precedential value remains unclear. In general, the ruling has certainly made
it difficult to definitively determine what the future holds for native title in
Australia, particularly with respect to the mining industry.
Nevertheless, after all of the preceding analysis, some educated
predictions about the future can be made. In general, the best solution for all
parties concerned seems to be a greater attempt at mediation and negotiation
of treaties regarding various rights and interests as opposed to resorting to
further litigation.232 As the Ward decision made clear, attempts to further
litigate sensitive and close questions of native title will only result in more
confused, costly and controversial litigation that would not likely resolve
matters as easily or as coherently as an established system of negotiation
would. The encouraging news, at least during the immediate fallout from the
High Court's ruling, seems to be that all sides involved seem to agree that
further litigation will prove futile and a system of agreements and treaties
regarding native title may be the appropriate solution. Of course, both sides
have rather different hopes for how the negotiation process would work,
which may ultimately prove to be an obstacle to reaching agreements through
negotiation.
Most people, even those in the mining industry who have benefited
from, or were pleased with the result of the litigation, agree that it is not an
efficient way to deal with these issues. As Attorney General Williams has
stated: "mining is one of Australia's key industries. About 40% of
Australia's merchandise exports come from the minerals sector. The growth
of the sector depends on continued exploration and the opening up of new
reserves." 233 That being said, Attorney General Williams has blamed the
recent decline in mining exploration in Australia, at least in part, on the
uncertainty created by all of the contested native title issues.234 Even as far
disputed land had been extinguished. For an analysis of the decision see the Australian law firm of Aliens
Arthur Robinson's comments available at www.aar.com.au/pubs/nat/fonatdec02.htm ("[Niative title
claimants will now be required to focus on proof of their traditional rights and customs - dating back to
before the time that sovereignty was acquired by Great Britain").
232Perth lawyer George Irving, who has worked closely with aboriginal groups on native title issues, feels
that:
[L]itigation generally is a last resort. If things can be negotiated between disputing parties, then
clearly that's a better outcome. The problem with going to court of course, is that you lose the
that ultimately makes a decision, and it
power to negotiate an outcome, and you have an umpire ...
may not please everyone.
See Interview, supra note 133.
21 See Williams, supra note 50 (Attorney General Williams quoted a specific statistic to emphasize his
point. In the 1996/1997 fiscal year, when expenditures on exploration activities in Australia reached their
peak, total expenditure reached $506 million. By the 1999/2000 fiscal year that amount had dropped all
the way down to $344 million and Williams only expected further declines); see also, McCarthy, supra
note 131 (Queensland Mining Council blaming the 67% drop in exploration funding from 1996 - 2001 on
the "inability of mining companies to get a speedy, cost effective and equitable access to land").
234See Williams, supra note 50 ("It is also clear that native title issues are having a discernible [sic]
impact on exploration levels").
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back as a year before the Court handed down its decision, Williams was well
aware of the problems of litigation and urged parties to settle things through
agreements, saying that "the Howard Government has long recognised that
agreements provide a practical solution for native title issues in the interests
of all parties. 235 In the wake of the Ward ruling, most mining industry
leaders agree and also wam that continued uncertainty through litigation will
not only discourage exploration spending but would also harm aborigines by
blocking their ability to obtain jobs and improved infrastructure.236
If the apparent "winners" in the litigation were not pleased with the
uncertainty of the ruling, it should come as no surprise that Aboriginal
groups are equally displeased and urge a different approach. They are clearly
upset with the loss of potentially huge economic opportunities in terms of
mineral ownership that they have been denied, while at the same time having
their rights to their land acknowledged. As a result, indigenous groups hope
to reach some common ground with the mining industry, allowing them to
somehow benefit from government wealth located on aboriginal land.
Wayne Bergman, spokesman for the Kimberly Land Council, has summed
up the general feelings and frustrations in the aboriginal community:
I see that Native Title, dealing with it through the
Courts, is not going to put food on our people's plates, build
houses, make them healthier. Native Title is far more
complicated than that, in the justice we want to achieve for
our people. I think today's decision is a demonstration as to
why we should not go to Court, in terms of not being able to
resolve these issues quickly. I think the better way is that
industry, people who are affected by Native Title who
require our land for development, need to come and consult
with us and work with us. And those principles need to be
developed with all governments, both State and Federal.237
It seems that using the courts as a mechanism to resolve native title disputes
has not been satisfactory to anyone involved, making negotiation the best
possible approach.
While both sides may have soured on litigation following the High
Court's ruling and agree that mediation or negotiation may be the best
approach, the fairness of the negotiation process is being intensely debated.
The Howard Government, as well as the mining industry has expressed an
interest in utilizing the negotiation framework established by the NTAA. It
235

d.

236See Goldsmith, supra note 6.
1

See Interview, supra note 133.

2003-2004]

Aboriginal Title in Australia

already exists and is fairly simple. However, as discussed earlier in this note,
many pro-aboriginal groups feel that the NTAA in general, and the
negotiation system specifically, do not sufficiently account for aboriginal
interests in the process. 2 38 As one newspaper put it, the mining industry
prefers the use of "native title agreements achieved through one-sided
negotiations within a framework in which real Aboriginal land rights have
already been ruled out. ' 23 9 Aboriginal groups would obviously prefer at least
a return to a 1993 NTA regime, where they had some greater leverage in
negotiation as well as greater general recognition of their rights.
Negotiations that are one-sided will ultimately prove just as futile as
litigation. Therefore, for any sort of meaningful agreements to be reached, a
new negotiation system must be established that fairly and evenly represents
the interest of both sides. Such a system seems as though it would be
ultimately beneficial to the mining industry as well. This is because until a
fair system of negotiation is created, the best hope for aboriginal groups to
obtain any native title rights may be through costly, time-consuming
litigation - a path that both sides have expressed disfavor towards.
V. CONCLUSION

As is often the complaint following lengthy and costly litigation, it
seems that "lawyers were the biggest winners in the long-running Ward
case." 240 When the case first reached the High Court of Australia, many
hoped that it would clarify the decade long chaos that existed in the area of
native title law. The chaos began with the famous Mabo decision in 1992,
which recognized the possibility of native title rights for the first time in
Australia's history and was expanded by Wik four years later. No one
disputes that the law as it stood before the Mabo decision was grossly unfair
in its complete disregard for aboriginal land rights. However, it was
certainly clear - Indigenous people in Australia had no rights to land. This
was certainly fine with the mining industry in Australia, who only needed an
appropriate government permit to explore potentially mineral-rich areas
located on aboriginal land. Mabo added the fear of possibly having to go
through litigation to determine the true ownership of the land. The mining
industry hoped that Ward would continue the work of the 1998 NTAA and
allay its fears by declaring native title to be extinguished.
Aborigines, on the other hand, hoped the High Court would treat
Mabo as only a beginning of long overdue recognition and would seize the
opportunity presented by Ward to expand upon the rights of aborigines.
They hoped that the policy behind Mabo - the recognition of aboriginal
rights - would similarly limit the force of the NTAA, perhaps ultimately
239See supra Part II.C.

Iverson, supra note 121.
'42
See "A Better Way," supra note 123.

239See
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leading to further amending. Court acknowledgment of aboriginal rights to
ownership of minerals on native land would have meant an economic
windfall for the Aborigines and, more importantly, a valuable tool with
which to negotiate.
As is often the case in lengthy and complex litigation that stretches
over many years, neither side was completely happy and the true practical
outcome was a tremendous bill to the Australian taxpayer. The mining
industry was pleased with the specific result but disappointed in the fact that
it could be narrowly construed as applying only to the disputed land before
the Court, leaving open the possibility for further litigation. Aborigines were
also upset with the result, which denied them rights to natural resources on
their land but did allow them to continue to stay on the land and
acknowledged their spiritual connection to the land. It is evident from the
long frustrating process of the Ward case that further litigation benefits no
one and the best remedy would be for the sides to negotiate a series of land
use agreements or treaties. Of course, this can only be done through a truly
fair system of mediation and negotiation, unlike the system established by
the NTAA, which favors government and mining interest over those of
aborigines. Once that system is created, there may be hope for resolving
some of these very controversial issues. The real frustration is that native title
law is so new and in the midst of such constant development in Australia,
that "it's not easy to get certainty in a hurry,, 2 4' and a truly just system of
negotiation and actual solutions to these complex problems, may be years
away.

241

See Interview, supra note 133.

